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A Classless Act 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ERRONEOUS CLASS 
CERTIFICATION IN DUKES V. WAL-MART, INC. 
INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2004, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California certified the largest private civil 
rights lawsuit in United States history – Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 
Inc.1  The proposed class is comprised of at least 1.5 million 
women,2 all of whom work or have worked at one of 
approximately 3,400 Wal-Mart stores across the United 
States.3  The plaintiffs claim that Wal-Mart sexually 
discriminated against them because they were paid less than 
men “in comparable positions,” “receive[d] fewer promotions to 
in-store management than d[id] men” and those who received 
promotions “wait[ed] longer than their male counterparts to 
advance.”4  The plaintiffs are seeking class-wide injunctive and 
declaratory relief, lost pay and punitive damages pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (“Title VII”).5 
The district court certified the class in Dukes using the 
criteria set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6  Rule 
23(a), governing class certification, contains four requirements7 
that must be met in order for a class to be certified.  These 
requirements are: (1) “the class is so numerous that joinder of 
  
 1 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 
David Kravets, Class Action Against Wal-Mart Approved, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 
June 23, 2004, at 4. 
 2 See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142.  The 1.5 million women are represented by 
six plaintiffs: Betty Dukes, Patricia Surgeson, Christine Kwapnoski, Deborah Gunter, 
Edith Arana, and Cleo Page.  See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification, at 3 n. 1, Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. Ca. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 3 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142, n.1.  Wal-Mart operates four types of stores: 
Discount Stores, Supercenters, Sam’s Clubs and Neighborhood Markets.  Id. at 141, 
n.1. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 143.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2). 
 7 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 
F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 275 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.”8  These factors 
are also known as: numerosity, commonality, typicality and 
adequacy.9  Rule 23(b) provides that the class must fulfill one of 
three additional requirements: (1) that separate actions by 
individual members of the class would produce inconsistent 
judgments; (2) that the party opposing the class “has acted or 
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class” 
making injunctive and/or declaratory relief appropriate; or (3) 
that any issues pertaining to individual members of the class 
are outweighed by issues that pertain to the class as a whole 
and that a class action lawsuit is the best method to adjudicate 
the issue or issues.10  
Class action lawsuits are an exception to the rule that 
litigation is normally conducted only on behalf of individuals 
and not individuals representing a group and, as such, a class 
must be carefully evaluated before it is certified.11  In General 
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,12 the Supreme Court 
concluded that in a Title VII class action lawsuit, a court must 
conduct a “rigorous analysis”13 to ensure “that the prerequisites 
of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”14  The Dukes court, however, 
deemphasized the importance of the Supreme Court’s “rigorous 
analysis” standard and held that a court maintains “broad 
discretion [in] determin[ing] whether a class should be 
certified.”15  By stressing the court’s ability to use “broad 
discretion,”16 the Dukes court found that the class met all of the 
requirements of Rule 23(a).  In doing so, the court pointed to 
  
 8 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 9 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143. 
 10 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 11 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting 
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at161.  See also Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 
1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 275 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 14 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161.  See also In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust 
Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677, 684 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (stating that the court would “scrutinize the 
evidence plaintiffs propose to use in proving their claims without unnecessarily 
reaching the merits of underlying claims.”). 
 15 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 
n.28 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 16 Id. 
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evidence of a strong and centralized corporate culture17 at Wal-
Mart, which enabled it to control all of the stores and their 
operations.18  Such control laid the groundwork for the entire 
class to suffer an injury, which resulted from a specific 
discriminatory practice.19  Because the class possibly contains 
1.5 million women, neither side challenged the class’s ability to 
meet Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement.  Such a large class, 
though, can backfire against a class, as will be discussed in 
Section IV.20  The court also held that the class met the 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the primary purpose 
of the litigation is to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, 
even though class members are seeking punitive damages.21  
According to Rule 23(b)(2), injunctive relief must outweigh any 
punitive damages sought in order to maintain class action 
status.22  In this case, the court held that the injunctive relief 
related to ending sexual discrimination at Wal-Mart 
“predominates”23 over any possible punitive award, even one 
that could be in the billions of dollars.24 
  
 17 As evidence of Wal-Mart’s strong corporate culture, the Dukes court noted 
that “every new employee nation-wide goes through the same orientation process 
and . . . is trained about the Wal-Mart culture.  Thereafter, employees at Wal-Mart 
stores attend a daily meeting . . . where managers discuss company culture and 
employees do the Wal-Mart cheer.  Employees also receive weekly training on culture 
topics at mandatory store meetings.”  Id. at 151 (citations omitted).  While the court 
pointed to these characteristics as evidence of a strong corporate culture, there is no 
connection between a corporation maintaining a strong corporate culture, on the one 
hand, and, making local store managers responsible for hiring and promotion decisions, 
on the other hand. 
 18 Id. at 145-53. This evidence was used to satisfy the commonality 
requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  Id. at 145. 
 19 Id. at 167-68.  This evidence was used to satisfy the typicality requirement 
of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  Id. at 166-68. 
 20 See infra Section IV. 
 21 Dukes, at 170-71.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) only provides for injunctive and 
declaratory relief and not punitive damages.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  A 1991 
Amendment to Title VII allowed for punitive damages if the plaintiff could prove that 
the employer discriminated “with malice or with reckless indifference . . . .”  42 U.S.C. 
§1981a(b)(1) (1991).  
 22 The monetary damages must be “secondary to the primary claim for 
injunctive or declaratory relief.” Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(citing Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (1986)). 
 23 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 171. 
 24 Given the potential size of the class, it would seem quite obvious that any 
punitive damages award would be in the billions of dollars and would clearly outweigh 
any declaratory or injunctive relief that would be granted to the class. One can assume 
that this case would result in an award in the billions of dollars given the fact that in 
1999 a 10,000 employee sexual discrimination lawsuit settled for $25 million; if this 
award was divided equally among claimants, each claimant received $2,500.  See 
William C. Martucci et. al., Class Action Litigation in the Employment Arena – the 
Corporate Employers’ Perspective, 58 J. MO. B. 332, 336 (2002).  Assuming an 
 
522 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
This Note will argue that the Northern District of 
California incorrectly certified the class in Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores.25  Part II proceeds with an in-depth description of 
Dukes.  Part III then continues with a discussion of Rule 23 
and its requirements.  Part IV discusses why the court was 
incorrect in finding that the class in Dukes met the 
requirements of commonality and typicality.  Because this Note 
only challenges the court’s finding in Dukes regarding 
commonality and typicality, any issues regarding numerosity 
and/or adequacy of representation are not discussed.  Part IV 
also discusses the court’s use of expert witness testimony in 
certifying the class, and the importance of using a Daubert 
analysis in order to analyze potential expert witness testimony 
to certify a class.  Part V discusses the Title VII issues which 
are present in this case, and explains why the court should 
have denied class certification based on these issues.  Part VI 
argues that the court incorrectly ignored the issue of blackmail 
settlements and that the class should not have been certified 
because of the concern regarding blackmail settlements.26  Part 
VII proposes a method for certifying class action lawsuits 
similar to the Dukes case.  More specifically, the proposal will 
suggest that certification not be granted for “wall to wall” or 
“across the board” class action lawsuits.  Keeping in line with 
many other cases involving corporate parents, the proposal will 
limit the instances in which a class action lawsuit can be 
brought to cases where, unlike in Dukes, specific corporate 
policies existed that promoted a definite practice and where the 
corporate parent actively engaged in the day to day hiring, 
firing and promoting of employees.  The method will finally 
  
equivalent settlement per person here, the total award in this case would be $3.75 
billion.  At the high end of the scale, a 1992 sexual discrimination case against State 
Farm involving 814 women settled for $157 million.  Id. at 336, Appendix.  Therefore, 
each claimant received $192,874.69.  Id.  Extrapolating this value to the Wal-Mart case 
would result in a total settlement value of $289,312,039,312.  Wal-Mart’s market 
capitalization is only around $182,000,000,000.  See Summary of WAL MART 
STORES, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=WMT&d=t (last visited Oct. 2, 
2005).  Therefore, any award approaching the high end of the scale would bankrupt 
Wal-Mart and possibly force Wal-Mart to layoff thousands of employees. This result 
cannot be considered secondary to any injunctive or declaratory relief sought by the 
class. 
 25 Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear Wal-
Mart’s appeal of the lower court’s class certification.  A decision in that case is pending. 
Principal Br. For Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at 1-2 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Nos. 04-16688 & 04-16720). 
 26 Briefly, blackmail settlements occur when a group of plaintiffs try to 
gather as many potential class members as possible in order to scare the defendant 
into settling, rather than risk facing a jury award.  See infra nn. 253-58. 
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propose that allegations of sexual discrimination are best left to 
be heard on a more individual level, or at the very least, that 
class action lawsuits should be brought on a smaller scale, 
rather than as one class action lawsuit encompassing 1.5 
million women. 
I. DUKES V. WAL-MART: AN IN-DEPTH OVERVIEW 
In Dukes, the named plaintiffs include six women, each 
of whom worked for Wal-Mart either as an hourly or salaried 
worker in stores across the country.27  Despite claiming to 
represent women across the country, all of the representative 
plaintiffs worked in stores in California, three of whom worked 
at stores outside of California before moving to California.28  
Additionally, only one of the lead plaintiffs, Christine 
Kwapnoski, briefly occupied a salaried position.29  All of the 
women worked at a Wal-Mart store since at least 1997.30 
All of the named plaintiffs describe a set of policies 
which, they allege, point to a general policy by Wal-Mart to 
sexually discriminate against women.31  More specifically, the 
plaintiffs claim that as females, Wal-Mart’s policies hindered 
their ability to receive promotions.32  Plaintiffs also claim that 
female Wal-Mart employees received less pay than men for 
performing the same tasks.33  As a general basis for their 
claims, plaintiffs argue that Wal-Mart employed an excessively 
subjective decision-making process regarding their employment 
and possible promotions, which created an environment for 
sexual discrimination.34  Wal-Mart’s policy mandated that an 
hourly worker could only become a manager by participating in 
the Management Training Program.35  The plaintiffs allege 
  
 27 See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification, at 17-18, n.9, Dukes v. Wal-
Mart, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 28 Id.  Plaintiff Page worked in a Supercenter in Oklahoma before moving to 
California.  Plaintiff Gunter worked in a Discount Store in Texas before moving to 
California and Plaintiff Kwapnoski worked in a Sam’s Club in Missouri before 
transferring to a Sam’s Club in California.  See id. 
 29 Id. at 17-18 n.9.  It should be noted that she only held an entry-level 
managerial position as a Receiving Area Manager.  Id. 
 30 See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification, at 1, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. 
Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 31 See id. at 1-4. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 149-50. 
 35 See id. at 148.  In order to participate in the Management Training 
Program, an hourly employee must rise to the level of a Support Manager.  See id. 
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that, until recently, managers chose which employees would 
participate in the Program through a “tap on the shoulder” 
system.36  Under this system, managers chose candidates to 
participate in the Management Training Program by deciding 
for themselves who might make a good manager, rather than 
by relying on set guidelines.37  The named plaintiffs allege that 
this type of system suffered from “excessive subjectivity”38 in 
that male managers would pick male hourly employees to 
participate in the Management Training Program, more 
frequently than female employees.39 
Wal-Mart claims that, as the corporate parent, it cannot 
be held responsible for decisions made by store managers 
because the managers made decisions based on a certain 
amount of subjectivity.40  Moreover, despite the plaintiffs’ 
contentions regarding the nexus between excessive subjectivity 
and sexual discrimination, Wal-Mart cited a Ninth Circuit 
case, Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., to show that excessive 
subjectivity is not necessarily evidence of sexual 
discrimination.41  In Coleman, plaintiffs claimed that Quaker 
Oats committed age discrimination when, in the process of 
carrying out a large-scale layoff, it laid off two-thirds of 
workers over age forty.42  In determining whom to lay off, 
Quaker Oats considered an employee’s rankings in six areas 
and his overall ranking.43  The Ninth Circuit held in Coleman 
that Quaker Oats did not use an excessively subjective 
evaluation system in order to mask its true intention of firing 
the older employees.44  Similarly, Wal-Mart argues that even 
  
 36 See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification, at 2, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. 
Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ).  The plaintiff’s allege that this policy existed until 
recently citing that in January 2003, Wal-Mart moved from a “tap on the shoulder” 
program to posting job vacancies in the Management Program.  See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 
at 149.  
 37 See Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification, at 2, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. 
Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 38 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 149. 
 39 See Pl.’s Mot. For Class Certifcation at 2, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 40 See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification, at 4, 6-7, 14-15, 23-24, 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 41 See id. at 32 n. 19 (citing Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1285 
(9th Cir. 2000) (“While a subjective evaluation system can be used as a cover for illegal 
discrimination, subjective evaluations are not unlawful per se and ‘their relevance to 
proof of discriminatory intent is weak’”)) (quoting Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 
804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 42 Coleman, 232 F.3d 1271, 1278-79. 
 43 Id. at 1278. 
 44 Id. at 1285. 
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though it used a subjective system to evaluate employees, such 
a system does not necessarily mean that it maintained sexually 
discriminatory practices.  
At Wal-Mart, managers are given a certain amount of 
leeway with regard to some aspects of pay and promotion.45  
Wal-Mart asserts that when making decisions regarding pay, 
although it sets a range for each class of employee, store 
managers are able to depart from that scale.46  Wal-Mart 
argues, therefore, that because store managers control their 
individual stores as they see fit, Wal-Mart, as the corporate 
parent, cannot be held responsible for the individual pay 
decisions made by each store manager.47 
Similarly, Wal-Mart also claims that it cannot be held 
responsible for promotion decisions, because store managers 
make those decisions on a store-by-store basis.48  The plaintiffs 
even admit that store managers make promotion decisions on 
their own by choosing which hourly employees will participate 
in the Management Training Program.49  Wal-Mart claims that 
the purpose of this policy is to allow store managers to identify 
those people who they believe will make the best managers.50  
Wal-Mart argues that managers are best equipped to 
determine who would make a good manager, not a corporate 
officer who has virtually no knowledge of each of the stores’ 
employees.51 
In looking at the Dukes case, the court faced a number 
of issues that speak to the heart of Rule 23 and class 
certification.  Issues of subjectivity in hiring, promotion and 
pay practices at Wal-Mart raise concerns as to whether a class 
  
 45 See generally Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 46 See Def.’s Opp’n to Class Certification, at 14-15, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. 
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). After store managers decide to depart from the 
pay scale, the district manager can then question the store manager’s decision, after 
the fact, if the hourly rate departs from the standard minimum by more than 6%. See 
Pl.’s Mot. For Class Certification at 17 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ)  
 47 See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification, at 4, 6-7, 14-15, 23-24, 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 48 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 150. 
 49 Id. at 148. 
 50 See id. at 148.  Wal-Mart only sets minimum standards for promoting 
employees to the Management Training Program.  Those standards include the 
employee:  “have an ‘above average’ evaluation, have at least one year in their current 
position, be current on training, not be in a ‘high shrink’ department or store, be on the 
company’s ‘Rising Star’ list, and be willing to relocate.”  Id.  
 51 Id.  The court later faults Wal-Mart for not overseeing promotion decisions 
made by store managers given its ability to oversee such things as the type of music 
played in each store.  Id. at 151-53.  
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can meet all the requirements of Rule 23.  If in fact Wal-Mart 
maintained excessively subjective practices in hiring, 
promotion, and pay, then proving commonality and typicality 
would appear to be quite difficult.  Given the “increased 
skepticism – particularly among members of the federal 
judiciary – toward the class action as an effective dispute-
resolution mechanism in the employment context,”52 courts 
must carefully consider all of Rule 23’s requirements before 
certifying a class. 
II. RULE 23 
A. An Overview 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
the framework for class action litigation.53  A class action 
lawsuit is a unique form of litigation because it seeks relief on 
behalf of a large group of people not limited to the named 
plaintiffs.54  The reasons for allowing class action litigation are 
fourfold: 1) it promotes judicial economy; 2) it provides a single 
remedy for a group when it is uneconomical to seek multiple 
remedies in individual lawsuits; 3) it provides greater plaintiff 
access to courts through spreading of litigation costs; and 4) it 
protects defendants from inconsistent jury verdicts.55 
As discussed earlier, Rule 23(a) contains four 
requirements that a class must meet in order to be certified: 
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy.56  If a class 
meets all four of these requirements, it then must meet one of 
the three further requirements of Rule 23(b).57  Typically, civil 
rights lawsuits fall under the rubric of Rule 23(b)(2) where the 
“party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class,”58 as described by the 
Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23,59 because all the class 
  
 52 Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive? 37 
AKRON L. REV. 813 (2004). 
 53 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 54 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982). 
 55 See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.02 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
 56 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 57 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 58 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (“This subdivision is 
intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused to take action 
with respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding 
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members are claiming that the defendant has wronged them in 
a common way.60 
In determining if a class meets the requirements of Rule 
23 for certification, courts are split as to how they should 
evaluate the class’s allegations.  In General Telephone. Co. of 
the Southwest v. Falcon,61 the Supreme Court held that courts 
should perform a “rigorous analysis” to ensure that a class 
meets each of the requirements of Rule 23(a).62  In an earlier 
decision, though, the Court held in Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin63 that a judge cannot go so far as to “conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to 
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”64  It 
has been noted, though, that judges apply this holding 
inconsistently.65  Since Falcon, courts have had a difficult time 
finding a middle ground between Eisen and Falcon.66  One 
court went so far as to require a party seeking to certify a class 
to show “under a strict burden of proof, that all requirements of 
[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 23(a) are clearly met.”67 
B. Commonality 
The commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is meant 
to ensure that all potential class members have their case 
adequately heard when joinder of all plaintiffs would be 
“impracticable.”68  In determining whether a particular class 
  
declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a 
whole, is appropriate . . . . Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where  
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose 
members are incapable of specific enumeration.”). 
 60 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 61 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 62 Id. at 161. 
 63 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 64 Id. at 177. 
 65 Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1254 (2002). In fact, Bone and Evans argue that rather than 
apply the requirements of Rule 23, judges decide certification based on “the value of the 
class action” and that “[j]udges seem more willing to overlook evidentiary weaknesses 
and certify a class the more strongly they believe in the importance of the class action 
for enforcement of the substantive law.”  Id. at 1272.  
 66 “We have noted that the ‘boundary between a class determination and the 
merits may not always be easily discernible.’”  Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of 
Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Eggleston v. Chicago Journeyman 
Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1981)). 
 67 Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Rex v. 
Owens ex rel. Okla., 585 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1978)). 
 68 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
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meets this requirement, the Supreme Court directed lower 
courts to focus on whether there are common facts and legal 
issues among class members.69  A class can satisfy this 
requirement by sharing only one common legal issue or fact.70 
Courts have acknowledged that class action cases 
concerning sexual discrimination in the employment context 
generally meet the commonality requirement when decisions 
regarding employment are centralized to a particular place or 
within a particular group.71  In Dean v. Boeing Co., the plaintiff 
sued Boeing on behalf of female employees at a limited number 
of plants in the United States.72  The District Court of Kansas 
held that the commonality requirement was met in part 
because there was a common question of law or fact to all 
plaintiffs in that all of the women worked at Boeing’s Kansas 
operations.73  Likewise, in Penk v. Oregon State Board of 
Higher Education,74 the proposed class consisted of “all women 
faculty members who have taught or are teaching at Oregon’s 
eight institutions of higher education . . . .”75  Given the 
centralized nature of a public school system, the District Court 
of Oregon found that “the Board, [and] not each individual 
institution, assure[s] compliance with Oregon’s law against 
educational discrimination.”76 
On the other hand, when the decision-making process is 
decentralized or stratified, courts tend to find that 
commonality does not exist because the employees are dealt 
with on a more local level, rather than by a corporate parent.  
In Droughn v. FMC Corp.,77 the defendant comprised three 
different areas of employment, each engaged in distinct tasks, 
  
 69 See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.23 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 267 (D. Md. 2004) (stating that 
finding commonality is more prevalent in an employment discrimination lawsuit when, 
“the alleged pattern or practice was sufficiently centralized and defined so as to 
eliminate the need for individualized inquiries on liability.”).  The court cited cases 
where commonality existed when there was a centralized decision-making process in a 
single location or evidence of a corporate wide policy of discrimination.  See, e.g., 
Newsome v. Up-To-Date Laundry, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 356, 361-62 (D. Md. 2004); Hewlett 
v. Premier Salons Int’l, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 211, 216-17 (D. Md. 1997). 
 72 Dean v. Boeing Co., No. 02-1019-WEB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8787, at *4 
(D. Kan., Apr. 24, 2003). 
 73 Id. at *47. 
 74 Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 93 F.R.D. 45 (D. Or. 1981). 
 75 Id. at 48. 
 76 Id. at 50. 
 77 Droughn v. FMC Corp., 74 F.R.D. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
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with 48,000 employees across thirty-two states and thirteen 
countries.78  FMC employees alleged that FMC engaged in 
sexual and racial discrimination.79  The Eastern District Court 
of Pennsylvania held that the proposed class could not be 
certified, because “FMC, consistent with its structurally 
diverse and geographically widespread organization, has 
adopted a decentralized approach to personnel practices.  Not 
only is there no evidence of employment practices emanating 
from national corporate headquarters, but there is also nothing 
to suggest that the Chemical Group maintains a firm grip on 
employment policy within different segments of the division.”80  
Similarly, in Talley v. ARINC, Inc.,81 the District Court of 
Maryland rejected plaintiffs’ class, because no “cohesive 
pattern” of discrimination existed to find that the class 
satisfied the commonality requirement.82  By highlighting the 
stratified nature of these company’s employment practices, 
these courts show that maintaining a practice of making 
employment decisions at the local level is a legitimate defense 
for a corporate parent. 
C. Typicality 
When evaluating whether or not a class has met the 
typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3),83 courts often  note that 
“[t]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) 
tend to merge,”84 because “[b]oth serve as guideposts for 
determining whether under the particular circumstances 
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the 
named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated 
  
 78 Id. at 641. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 642. 
 81 222 F.R.D. 260 (D. Md. 2004). 
 82 Id. at 267.  See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text for a more 
detailed discussion of the Talley case. 
 83 Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 84 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982).  
See also Rowe v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 01-6965, 2003 U.S. District LEXIS 
19561, at *17 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 30, 2003); Campos v. INS, 188 F.R.D. 656, 659 (S.D. 
Fla. 1999); Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 133 F.R.D. 82, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); 
Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1271, 1273-74 (N.D. Ohio 1986).  All of 
these cases cite Falcon for the proposition that the commonality and typicality 
requirements of Rule 23 “tend to merge.” 
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that the interests of the class members will be fairly and 
adequately protected in their absence.”85  However, this is not 
to say that courts do not evaluate typicality independently or 
that the typicality requirement does not have its own set of 
criteria.86  When evaluating typicality, courts look to see 
whether “other members of the class . . . have the same or 
similar grievances as the plaintiff.”87  Put otherwise, “the 
typicality requirement assesses the sufficiency of the named 
plaintiff.”88  By focusing on the plaintiff’s claims, courts can 
discern between claims that have a common basis from those 
that require an individual evaluation, and therefore, are 
inappropriate for class action status. 
Historically, courts have held that “across-the-board” 
employment class action lawsuits fulfilled the typicality 
requirement of Rule 23.89  “Across-the-board” class action 
lawsuits consist of claims by a group of people that a system-
wide policy of discrimination exists, and that the entire system 
must be challenged and not an individual part of it.90  This 
means that a representative plaintiff could bring a class action 
lawsuit implicating an employer’s discriminatory practice, even 
if the representative plaintiff was only affected by one instance 
of such practice.91  However, in Falcon, the Supreme Court 
rendered “across-the-board” employment discrimination 
lawsuits obsolete “by insisting on actual, not presumed, 
compliance with the typicality . . . provisions of Rule 23.”92  In 
  
 85 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13. 
 86 But it is true that some courts view the typicality requirement as being 
redundant.  See, e.g., Bullock v. Bd. of Ed. of Montgomery County, 210 F.R.D. 556, 560 
(D. Md. 2002) (stating that the typicality requirement “has been observed to be a 
redundant criterion.”). 
 87 Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 562 (8th Cir. 1982).  See  Carpe 
v. Aquila, Inc., No. 02-0388-CV-W-FJG, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21590, at *6 (W.D. Mo. 
Sept. 13, 2004); Evans v. Am. Credit Sys., 222 F.R.D. 388, 394 (D. Neb. 2004); Bullock 
v. Bd. of Ed. of Montgomery County, 210 F.R.D. 556, 560 (D. Md. 2002). 
 88 In re Chrysler Corp. Paint Litig., No. 1239, 2000 U.S. District LEXIS 2332, 
at *16 (E.D. Pa. March 2, 2000). 
 89 Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 643, 648 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (discussing the history of across the board employment lawsuits). 
 90 See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 
1969) (reversing the lower court’s decision to narrow the scope of the case because even 
though different facts and circumstances applied to different employees, the named 
plaintiff challenged system-wide discrimination on behalf of all African-American 
workers.). 
 91 Miller, 89 F. Supp. at 648. 
 92 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1985), aff’d 482 
U.S. 656 (1987) (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982)). 
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distinguishing between an individual’s claim of discrimination 
and classwide discrimination, the Court stated: 
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim 
that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and 
his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy 
of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who 
have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the 
individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims. For [plaintiff] to 
bridge the gap, he must prove much more than the validity of his 
own claim.93 
Ultimately, for a class to meet the typicality 
requirement, the court must determine that the potential class 
members’ interests are “fairly encompassed” with the named 
plaintiffs’ interests.94 
Turning to post-Falcon class actions in the employment 
context, courts have found that an employment class has 
fulfilled the typicality requirement of Rule 23 when the 
discrimination emanated from a “centrally administered 
policy.”95  This is demonstrated in Mathers v. Northshore 
Mining Co.,96 where the District Court of Minnesota held that a 
group of women who “work[ed] in eight particular 
departments”97 met the typicality requirement.98  By specifying 
that the class members worked in a limited number of 
departments within the company’s mining operation, the court 
emphasized that it certified the class because of a policy 
administered by the corporation.99  It should be noted that 
many courts have stated that “typicality is not demanding,”100 
and, as such, courts sometimes give little or no explanation 
regarding this requirement of class certification.  Additionally, 
the opposing party sometimes does not attempt to challenge 
the class’s assertion that it meets the typicality requirement.101 
  
 93 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-58.  
 94 Id. at 160. 
 95 Resnick v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 90 F.R.D. 530, 539 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 96 Mathers v. Northshore Mining Co., 217 F.R.D. 474 (D. Minn. 2003). 
 97 Id. at 486. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing James v. 
City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 571 (5th Cir. 2001)).  See also Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 
994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 101 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1764 (2d ed. 1986).  
532 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
Despite the low threshold that courts demand for the 
typicality requirement, given the issues raised by the Court in 
Falcon, courts have denied class certification based on a 
classes’ inability to meet the typicality requirement.102  As 
mentioned earlier, in cases where a class did not satisfy the 
typicality requirement, the representative plaintiff or plaintiffs 
often had a unique claim103 or attempted to implicate an 
individual incident of discrimination as indicative of a 
companywide policy of discrimination.104  In both ARINC and 
Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Medical Group, the representative 
plaintiffs attempted to take their individual claims and apply 
them to all members of a similarly situated group of people.105  
In Abrams, Kelsey-Seybold operated twenty outpatient clinics 
in the Houston area.  The plaintiffs alleged racial 
discrimination in employment decisions regarding promotions 
and layoffs.106  Although the plaintiffs reduced the class size 
three times, the Southern District Court of Texas still found 
that, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Falcon, the 
claims were individual in nature and not applicable to the 
whole class.107  
Likewise, ARINC was a government contractor with 
over 3,000 employees in twenty-four states.108  All of the 
plaintiffs in the lawsuit worked either at ARINC’s 
headquarters in Annapolis, Maryland or in its Washington, 
D.C. office.109  The plaintiffs attempted to represent all African-
American employees, alleging racial and sexual discrimination 
in promotions and layoffs.110  The District Court of Maryland 
held, however, that the plaintiffs improperly attempted to 
  
 102 See generally ARINC, 222 F.R.D. at 268; Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Med. 
Group Inc., 178 F.R.D. 116, 129 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 103 See Boyce v. Honeywell, 191 F.R.D. 669, 676 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (stating that 
“the claims asserted by the eight named plaintiffs . . . cover a vast array of individual 
circumstances” and therefore “this case does not appear to implicate a common, general 
policy . . . which has a discriminatory impact on the class.”). 
 104 See ARINC, 222 F.R.D. at 268 (“This case does not present the factual 
scenario of a discriminatory practice being applied so as to broadly discriminate 
against persons in the identical manner”); Abrams, 178 F.R.D. at 129 (S.D. Tex. 1997) 
(“[I]n cases alleging classwide disparate treatment in particular employment actions, 
plaintiffs must show a company-wide policy or practice, beyond individualized claims of 
discrimination.”). 
 105 See generally ARINC, 222 F.R.D 260; Abrams, 178 F.R.D. 116. 
 106 Kelsey-Seybold Med. Group, Inc., 178 F.R.D. at 119. 
 107 Id. at 129. 
 108 ARINC, 222 F.R.D. at 263. 
 109 Id. at 265. 
 110 Id. at 263. 
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combine several individual claims of sexual and racial 
discrimination, when in reality, each plaintiff’s claim required 
individualized proof.111 
III. THE COURT’S DECISION IN DUKES V. WAL-MART 
A. The Finding of Commonality 
As discussed above, commonality focuses on whether 
there are common facts and legal issues among class 
members.112  In Dukes, the court held that commonality existed 
between the class representatives and the potential class 
members because they all suffered from the same subjective 
corporate policies regarding compensation and promotion.113  
The class representatives presented three types of evidence to 
prove this allegation.114  First, they pointed to Wal-Mart’s 
“excessive[ly] subjectiv[e]”115 policies regarding compensation 
and promotions.116  Second, they offered “expert statistical 
evidence”117 which demonstrated a connection between gender 
disparities and discrimination.118  Finally, they presented the 
court with “anecdotal evidence”119 regarding management’s 
tolerance for or promulgation of discrimination.120  The court 
stated that considered together, “this evidence more than 
satisfies plaintiffs’ burden”121 in meeting Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23’s commonality requirement. 
Notwithstanding the court’s holding, the plaintiffs failed 
to meet the commonality criteria.  Just because class 
representatives worked for the same corporation as potential 
class members, it does not follow that they all suffered from a 
common policy of discrimination.  As discussed earlier, 
plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart policies prevented them from 
receiving promotions and that Wal-Mart awarded greater 
compensation for men who performed the same tasks as 
  
 111 Id. at 268. 
 112 See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 23.23 (3d ed. 
1999). 
 113 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 145 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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women.122  There is a significant difference, though, between an 
individual allegedly suffering from corporate-wide 
discrimination in promotion and pay practices and a group of 
people all suffering from the same injury such that there are 
common questions of law and fact pertaining to all of the 
plaintiffs.123  
This idea is especially apparent in a corporation like 
Wal-Mart, “the largest employer in the world,”124 because it 
would be very difficult for an employee in Maine, for example, 
to suffer from the same discrimination as an employee in 
Oregon.  Wal-Mart utilizes a tiered managerial system,125 
which makes it virtually impossible for corporate headquarters 
to control decisions made at the local level.126  Individual Wal-
Mart store managers are solely responsible for setting 
compensation levels for hourly positions and “are granted 
substantial discretion in making salary decisions.”127  In fact, in 
McCree v. Sam’s Club,128 which involved Sam’s Club, one of the 
four types of Wal-Mart stores,129 the Middle District Court of 
Alabama recognized Sam’s Club’s policy whereby store 
managers determined the eligibility criteria for Sam’s Clubs’ 
management training program.130  In deciding whether the 
plaintiffs could show that this policy was discriminatory, the 
court stated, “Plaintiffs do not attempt to show that this policy 
is in itself . . . discriminatory, but merely argue that it must 
allow for discriminatory practices by local stores because of the 
raw statistics furnished.  Such speculation does not satisfy the 
court that this case is an appropriate one for class action.”131  
On the contrary, the Dukes court certified the class relying on 
  
 122 See generally supra Part II.  
 123 Hart, supra note 52, at 819 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, at 157 (1982)).  
 124 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141. 
 125 Id. at 146.  At the bottom of the managerial system are assistant managers 
and specialty department managers.  Id.  These managers report to the store manager, 
who in turn reports to the district manager.  Id. at 145.  Wal-Mart operates four 
different types of stores and all stores are divided into seven divisions.  Id. at 145.  
Each division is divided into regions, for a total of 41 regions nationwide, with each 
region containing roughly 80-85 stores.  Id. This results in a total of almost 3,500 
stores.  Id. 
 126 See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 4, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 
Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 127 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 146. 
 128 McCree v. Sam’s Club, 159 F.R.D. 572 (M.D. Ala. 1995). 
 129 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141 n.1. 
 130 See McCree, 159 F.R.D. at 577. 
 131 Id.  
2005] CLASS CERTIFICATION IN DUKES V. WAL-MART 535 
statistics regarding the percentage of women who held hourly 
positions versus the percentage of women who held salaried 
positions, as well as statistical evidence of discrimination and 
statistical evidence regarding compensation.132  It is surprising, 
therefore, that the Dukes court did not follow the court’s 
decision in McCree and deny certification based on a lack of 
evidence of a national policy of discrimination at Wal-Mart. 
Another way that courts have described the 
commonality requirement is that all of the plaintiffs must 
suffer from a common policy which results in a common 
injury.133  In cases where courts certified a class in an “across-
the-board” case, plaintiffs all suffered from the same policy and 
suffered a common injury.134  An example of this is found in 
Newsome v. Up-to-Date Laundry. Plaintiffs, were denied the 
opportunity to work overtime and received less pay.135  
Although no explicit policy forbidding African-Americans from 
working overtime existed, defendants openly used racial slurs, 
and plaintiffs presented statistical evidence that they were 
subject to less favorable conditions and terms than other 
workers.136  In effect, the plaintiffs suffered from an unspoken 
policy that amounted to racial discrimination.  Unlike the 
plaintiffs in Newsome, who suffered from a common policy, the 
Dukes plaintiffs cannot point to a Wal-Mart policy, latent or 
overt, that encourages sexual discrimination.  Plaintiffs in 
Dukes rely on the argument that Wal-Mart’s policies contained 
“excessive subjectivity,” which, in effect, led to sexual 
discrimination.137  However, the Ninth Circuit held in Coleman, 
that “subjective evaluations are not unlawful per se and their 
relevance to proof of discriminatory intent is weak.”138 
Other courts have also held that when promotion 
decisions were made on a local level, the parent company was 
  
 132 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 146, 154-56. 
 133 See Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 268 (N.D. Md. 2004) (stating 
that for a class to be certified it must “present the factual scenario of a discriminatory 
practice being applied so as to broadly discriminate against persons in the identical 
manner.”). 
 134 See, e.g., Newsome v. Up-to-Date Laundry, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 356, 361-62 
(N.D. Md. 2004); Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Co., 217 F.R.D. 178, 187 (D. Md. 
2003); Hewlett v. Premier Salons Int’l, 185 F.R.D. 211, 216-17 (D.C. Md. 2003).  
 135 Newsome, 219 F.R.D. at 360. 
 136 See id.  
 137 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151. 
 138 Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1285 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
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not liable and the class was not certified.139  In those cases, the 
courts held that although corporate headquarters determined 
hiring and promotion guidelines, because local managers 
implemented those policies, “the circumstances of each 
proposed class representative’s case will depend on how a 
specific manager treated that proposed class representative at 
his or her store.”140  Plaintiffs’ attempt to hold Wal-Mart 
responsible for decisions made on a local level is misguided 
because district managers had the ability to oversee pay and 
promotion decisions made by store managers,141 and therefore, 
they should be held responsible for any sexual discrimination, 
not corporate headquarters.  
The court in Dukes further emphasized that the 
“subjective manner” in which store managers made hiring and 
promotion decisions militated for class certification.142  The 
court pointed to the “considerable discretion”143 given to store 
managers to make those decisions and the fact that this 
discretion was “deliberate and routine,”144 which made Wal-
Mart “susceptible to being infected by discriminatory 
animus.”145  In describing Wal-Mart’s employment practices as 
discriminatory,146 the court neglected to discuss Reid v. 
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics.147  In Reid, plaintiffs sued 
Lockheed Martin on behalf of African-American employees 
working in facilities across the country, claiming that the 
  
 139 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619, 
682 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 670 
(N.D. Ga. 2001); Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558, 567 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  
 140 Rhodes, 213 F.R.D. at 676 (stating that “[s]everal other courts have found 
that the commonality requirement is not satisfied where geographic diversity or an 
absence of centralized decision-making exists, or where different decision-makers made 
the challenged decisions”).  See also Donaldson, 205 F.R.D. at 567; Reid, 205 F.R.D. at 
669; Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1999) 
(stating, “[t]he fact that [employment] decisions are handled by one’s immediate 
supervisor based on subjective criteria would be useful evidence in an individual 
disparate treatment claim, but works against class certification of a disparate impact 
claim when the proposed class is subject to the same local autonomy in geographically 
dispersed facilities.”). 
 141 See Def’s Opp. to Class Certification, at 14-15, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. 
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ). 
 142 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145. 
 143 Id. at 153. 
 144 Id. at 149. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988); 
Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); Casillas v. 
United States Navy, 735 F.2d 338, 345 (9th Cir. 1984) (cases where courts rejected 
plaintiffs’ attempts to attack employment practices as discriminatory).  
 147 Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
2005] CLASS CERTIFICATION IN DUKES V. WAL-MART 537 
company engaged in racial discrimination by allowing facility 
managers to use subjective criteria when making employment 
decisions.148  The Northern District of Georgia denied 
certification, because the Reid plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in 
Dukes, had essentially claimed that Lockheed Martin had a 
“centralized policy of decentralization”149 under which facility 
managers had the autonomy to use subjective criteria when 
making employment decisions.150  The court held that this is an 
insufficient basis to maintain a multi-facility class action 
lawsuit because “Title VII prohibits discriminatory 
employment practices, not an abstract policy of 
discrimination.”151  Reid and Dukes are factually and legally 
analogous: both involve an abstract claim of discrimination 
whereby the plaintiffs attempted to hold a corporate parent 
liable, when in reality, no substantive corporate policy existed 
that could implicate the corporate parent. 
Furthermore, Dukes cited Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust152 as proof that subjective decision-making is a basis for 
class certification when the factual scenario in Watson should 
have led the Dukes court to the exact opposite conclusion.153  In 
Watson, a woman sued an individual bank for racial 
discrimination on the grounds that the bank used subjective 
criteria in its employment decisions that led to 
discrimination.154  A key fact in Watson, which the Dukes court 
failed to mention, was that Watson did not involve a class 
action lawsuit.  Apart from this, the Reid court emphasized the 
fact that claims of subjective decision-making give rise to 
individual claims, and not class action lawsuits.155  The Dukes 
  
 148 Id. at 657-59. 
 149 Id. at 670.  
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 670 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 
n.15 (5th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original)). 
 152 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
 153 See Dukes at 149. 
 154 See id. at 977. 
 155 See Reid, 205 F.R.D. at 670 (stating that using subjective criteria “does not 
mean that subjective employment practices necessarily give rise to a broad, multi-
facility class; rather, it leads to the opposite conclusion.”).  The Reid court cited a 
number of cases where other courts emphasized this point.  See, e.g.,  Stastny v. S. Bell 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 279 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that “evidence of subjectivity 
in employment decisions may well serve to bolster proof on the merits of individual 
claims of disparate treatment . . . it cuts against any inference for class action 
commonality purposes that local facility practices were imposed or enforced state-wide 
with respect to a statewide class”); Zachery v. Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 
230, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (stating that “[t]he fact that [employment] decisions are 
 
538 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
court, therefore, incorrectly cited Watson and the proposition 
that it stands for – that claims of subjective decision-making 
are appropriate in cases involving a single facility or location 
and not multi-facility – to support “across-the-board” class 
action lawsuits.  
Although the Dukes court held that a subjective 
decision-making process could serve as a basis for a 
discrimination claim, there are cases where courts rejected the 
use of this argument even when the case involved an individual 
plaintiff.  In Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the claim that subjective decision-making alone 
can be used to prove discrimination.156  In Sengupta, the 
plaintiff claimed that Morrison-Knudsen utilized subjective 
criteria in its employee evaluations, which led to racial 
discrimination and plaintiff’s discharge.157  In dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claim, the court in Sengupta held that subjectivity is 
not grounds for proving discrimination, because “[its] relevance 
to proof of a discriminatory intent is weak.”158  Furthermore, in 
Casillas v. United States Navy, the plaintiff claimed that the 
Navy used subjective decision-making practices as a cover for 
national origin discrimination and that the Navy used these 
practices to prevent his promotion.159  The Ninth Circuit flatly 
rejected plaintiff’s claim, stating that “[w]e have explicitly 
rejected the idea that an employer’s use of subjective 
employment criteria has a talismanic significance.”160  
As the final basis for deciding that the plaintiffs fulfilled 
the commonality requirement of Rule 23, the Dukes court noted 
Wal-Mart’s “strong . . . distinctive, centrally controlled, 
corporate culture.”161  The court claimed that this strong 
corporate culture led to “uniformity of operational and 
personnel practices,”162 and that these practices “[include] 
  
handled by one’s immediate supervisor based on subjective criteria would be useful 
evidence in an individual disparate treatment claim, but works against class 
certification of a disparate impact claim when the proposed class is subject to the same 
local autonomy in geographically dispersed facilities”) (emphasis in original). 
 156 Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986).  
(stating “[t]he use of subjective employment criteria is not unlawful per se” and “their 
relevance to proof of a discriminatory intent is weak.”). 
 157 Id. at 1073-75.  
 158 Id. at 1075. 
 159 Casillas v. United States Navy, 735 F.2d 338, 340-42 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 160 Id. at 345. 
 161 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 162 Id. 
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gender stereotyping.”163  There is an inherent tension, though, 
with claiming, on the one hand, that the decision-making 
process at Wal-Mart is subjective, and on the other hand, that 
a strong corporate culture existed at Wal-Mart that led to a 
“uniformity of operational and personnel practices.”164 The 
court even acknowledged this contradiction,165 but attempted to 
reconcile it by holding that the subjective decision-making on 
the local level allows gender bias to become a common part of 
the Wal-Mart system.166  This holding was in direct contrast 
with the Reid court’s more reasonable summary of similar 
plaintiffs’ arguments, in which it was observed that, “[t]he best 
characterization of Plaintiffs’ theory is that Defendants had a 
centralized policy of decentralization, which is insufficient on 
these facts to satisfy commonality . . . with respect to Plaintiffs’ 
proposed multi-facility cases.”167 In certifying the class, the 
Dukes court effectively acknowledged that subjective decision-
making practices are not grounds for a class action lawsuit, 
and used animus against Wal-Mart’s “strong corporate culture” 
as a way of glossing over the legal gaps in the court’s 
reasoning.168 
B. The Typicality Finding 
Turning to Rule 23’s typicality requirement, the Dukes 
court found that, although the plaintiffs worked in Wal-Mart 
stores across the country, they fulfilled this requirement 
because they were subject to “excessively subjective decision-
making in a corporate culture of uniformity and gender 
stereotyping.”169  In other words, even though one plaintiff 
worked in a store in New York and another in a store in 
  
 163 Id. at 150. 
 164 Id. at 151. 
 165 “The Court recognizes that there is a tension inherent in characterizing a 
system as having both excessive subjectivity at the local level and centralized control.”  
Id. at 152. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Reid, 205 F.R.D. at 670. 
 168 There are numerous websites whose sole purpose is to portray Wal-Mart as 
an evil corporate giant. See, e.g., Walmart Sucks, http://www.walmartsucks.org (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2004); Walmart Blows, http://www.walmart-blows.com (last visited Oct. 
15, 2005); Walmart Watch, http://www.walmartwatch.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2004).  
Cities have also gone on the offense against Wal-Mart by passing zoning laws that 
prevent “big box” stores such as Wal-Mart from opening.  See, e.g., Wake-Up Wal-Mart, 
Zoning changes prohibit big-box stores, at http://wakeupwalmart.com/news/20050527-
tcre.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).  
 169 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167. 
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California, both suffered from a “common practice,”170 and 
thereby fulfilled Rule 23’s requirement that “claims or defenses 
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class.”171 
A problem with the Dukes court’s decision regarding 
typicality is that, on the one hand, it held that the named 
representatives and all possible plaintiffs suffered from typical 
claims, but on the other hand, acknowledged that the claims 
are “individual-specific.”172  This leads to a serious problem: if 
the plaintiffs’ claims were “individual-specific,” then the court 
will have to examine each plaintiff’s claim, which defeats the 
purpose of a class action lawsuit.173  Courts have routinely 
denied class certification where the court deemed necessary a 
review of each plaintiff’s individual claims.174  Moreover, the 
court in Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold Medical Group, Inc., went as 
far as to say that “[a] class may not be based on discrimination 
occurring in different departments, involving different decision 
makers.”175 
While the representative plaintiffs could conceivably 
bring a claim against their individual store managers, or even 
possibly against all Wal-Mart stores in California, “the 
consensus among other courts . . . is that a plaintiff may 
represent a multi-facility class only when centralized and 
uniform employment practices affect all facilities in the same 
  
 170 Id. at 167-68. 
 171 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 172 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167.  In acknowledging defendant’s objection based on 
the individual-specific nature of the plaintiffs’ claim, the court responded that “[s]ome 
degree of individualized specificity must be expected in all cases.” Id. 
 173 See Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619, 682 
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (in discussing one reason for not certifying the class, the court stated 
that “the proposed class representatives’ and members’ disparate treatment claims will 
require individualized factual determinations.  Plaintiffs consequently cannot satisfy 
the typicality requirement with respect to their disparate treatment claims.”). 
 174 See id. (concluding its analysis of the typicality requirement by stating that 
“Plaintiffs consequently cannot satisfy the typicality requirement with respect to their 
disparate treatment claims.”).  See also Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 268  (D. 
Md. 2004) (“Plaintiffs have aggregated several individual complaints that require 
individualized proof and give rise to individualized defenses . . . . This case does not 
present the factual scenario of a discriminatory practice being applied so as to broadly 
discriminate against persons in the identical manner.”); Abrams v. Kelsey-Seybold 
Med. Group, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 116, 129 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (“[T]he courts have made it clear 
that in cases alleging classwide disparate treatment in particular employment actions, 
plaintiffs must show a company-wide policy or practice, beyond individualized claims of 
discrimination.”). 
 175 Abrams, 178 F.R.D. at 129. 
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way.”176  In situations where “employment practices were set by 
a plant manager located at each [division] facility . . . the court 
held that the plaintiffs could only represent 
those . . . employees employed at the first facility, and it 
excluded . . . those . . . employees that worked at the other 
three facilities.”177 
As mentioned earlier, the situation in Reid is extremely 
similar to the situation in Dukes whereby plaintiffs attempted 
to represent class members at several locations in several 
different states.178  In Reid, the court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion for class certification, because each plant determined 
employment practices and, in a multi-facility case, a plaintiff 
can only represent workers from his own facility, unless 
centralized policies existed.179  It would only seem logical, 
therefore, that in a case like Dukes, which involves over 3,400 
stores and in which each store manager had “substantial 
discretion”180 regarding employment decisions, that the court 
should have denied class certification as well.  This assertion is 
further bolstered by the court’s decision in ARINC, where the 
court held that “[a] class may not be based on discrimination 
occurring in different departments, involving different decision 
makers.”181  Surely, if a class cannot be certified when 
discrimination occurs in different departments, then a class 
cannot be certified when discrimination allegedly occurred in 
over 3,400 stores across the country.  Accordingly, the Dukes 
court erroneously and without reason ignored the rulings of its 
sister courts. 
In order for a class to satisfy the typicality requirement, 
the named plaintiffs must represent the interests of all other 
potential plaintiffs.182  Whereas the Dukes court cited cases that 
have allowed different types of plaintiffs to represent an entire 
class,183 the Dukes case is in fact different from those cases.  
  
 176 Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 667-68 (N.D. Ga. 
2001) (emphasis added). 
 177 Id. (citing Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 78 F.R.D. 645, 651 (E.D. Pa. 
1978)).  
 178 Id. at 659.   
 179 See id. at 669. 
 180 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 153 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 181 Abrams, 178 F.R.D. at 129 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 182 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). 
 183 See Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Meyer v. 
MacMillan Publ’g Co., 95 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Taylor v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 93 F.R.D. 1, 6 (S.D. W. Va. 1980). 
542 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
The plaintiffs’ class in Dukes is composed of hourly and 
salaried employees, even though the hourly employees’ case is 
based on discrimination allegedly perpetrated by the salaried 
mangers.184  In other cases where the plaintiffs sought to be 
certified as a class comprised of members with competing 
interests, the courts have held that the competing class 
members could not be in the same class.185 
Another issue raised during the court’s discussion of 
typicality in Dukes is whether the class representatives could 
represent the entire class even though only one of the 
representatives held a managerial position in a Sam’s Club 
store.186  The plaintiffs arranged their class so that Christine 
Kwapnoski, the only plaintiff to have held a managerial 
position, represented other managers, even though she only 
held an entry-level managerial position at a Sam’s Club.187  The 
Dukes court asserted that it is irrelevant whether or not there 
is a representative for each level of management,188 and 
specifically that Kwapnoski, as an entry-level manager,189 was 
not a member of upper management.190  Other courts have said 
that if there are conflicts between different managerial 
positions, then one manager cannot represent a different 
managerial position.191  Once again, rather than apply a 
“rigorous analysis”192 to the typicality requirement of Rule 23, 
  
 184 See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 34, Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (2004) (No. 01-2252). 
 185 See id. (citing Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558, 568 (W.D. 
Wash. 2001) (denying class certification and holding that “[a] conflict of interest may 
arise where a class contains both supervisory and non-supervisory employees.”)); 
Appleton v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., 168 F.R.D. 221, 233 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) 
(preventing plaintiffs from representing class members, the court stated, “members of 
the proposed class who are supervisors have likely been responsible for evaluating the 
performances of other members of the class – evaluations these nonsupervisory 
personnel may challenge as discriminatory.”). 
 186 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166. 
 187 See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 17-18 n.9, Dukes v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (2004) (No. 01-2252). 
 188 See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 93 F.R.D. 1, 6 (S.D. W. Va. 1980). 
 189 See supra note 29. 
 190 Id. at 166-67. 
 191 See Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Class Certification at 34 (citing Clayborne v. 
Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573, 587-88, 597-98 (D. Neb. 2002)); Morgan v. 
United Parcel Serv. of Am., 169 F.R.D. 349, 357-58 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that center 
managers could not adequately represent higher-level managerial employees due to 
potential conflicts of interest). 
 192 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15 (1982); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 253 
F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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the court chose to emphasize the “permissive”193 nature of the 
typicality requirement.  The court failed to recognize that while 
class actions should be certified when appropriate, the Court in 
Falcon demanded “rigorous analysis”194 of all applications for 
class action status because class action lawsuits are “an 
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and 
on behalf of the individual named parties only.”195 
In sum, the Dukes court found a basis for holding that 
the plaintiffs met the commonality and typicality requirements 
of Rule 23 based on the “broad discretion to determine whether 
a class should be certified”196 and the “permissive”197 nature of 
the typicality requirement.  
IV. THE COURT’S USE OF EXPERT WITNESSES AND THE LACK 
OF A DAUBERT ANALYSIS 
Courts rely on expert witnesses to determine if the 
assertions made by plaintiffs seeking class action status are 
accurate.198  Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 govern the 
admissibility of expert witness testimony.199  In Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, plaintiffs claimed that their 
children were born with birth defects as a result of a drug 
  
 193 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 167 (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 
(9th Cir. 2003)). 
 194 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15; Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. 
 195 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-
01 (1979)). 
 196 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 
n.28 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 197 See id. at 167 (citing Staton, 327 F.3d at 957). 
 198 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (citing FED. 
R. EVID. 702) (“‘If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue’ an expert ‘may 
testify thereto.’”) (emphasis in original); L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Between “Merit 
Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal 
Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2004). 
 199 See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703. The Advisory Committee Notes list five factors 
to determine the reliability of expert witness testimony. 
(1) [W]hether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested – 
that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective 
sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that 
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or 
theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or 
potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the 
existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the 
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
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manufactured by Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals.200  Merrell Dow 
challenged expert witness testimony presented by the plaintiff 
regarding the link between the drug and birth defects on the 
grounds that the testimony did not meet the criteria set forth 
in the precedental case of Frye v. United States.201  In Frye, the 
Court held that expert witness testimony is only admissible if 
the witness uses techniques that “have gained general 
acceptance” by the scientific community.202  In Daubert, 
however, the Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
allows judges “some gatekeeping responsibility” in admission of 
expert testimony.203  This “gatekeeping” role is meant to ensure 
that expert testimony is relevant to the issue and that the 
expert witness meets certain qualifications.204  In addition to 
being relevant to the issue and the expert witness being 
qualified, the evidence must also assist the fact-finder.205 
In Dukes,206 the court held a Daubert hearing regarding 
the admissibility of the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert 
witness relating to the presence of stereotypes and 
discrimination at Wal-Mart207 and concluded that only part of 
one witness’s testimony should be stricken.208  At the separate 
hearing, the court, in stating the legal standard for reviewing 
expert witness testimony at the class certification stage, held 
“‘that a lower Daubert standard should be employed at this 
[class certification] stage of the proceedings.’”209  The plaintiffs 
relied on three expert witnesses in order to prove that gender 
stereotyping and disparities exist at Wal-Mart.210  The 
testimony of one of the expert witnesses, Dr. Bielby, a 
sociologist, is especially troubling for a number of reasons.  Dr. 
  
 200 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582. 
 201 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 202 Id. at 1014. 
 203 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n. 7 (quoting Rehnquist’s opinion, concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, id. at 600). 
 204 Id. at 589.  The Supreme Court clarified this requirement to apply to all 
expert witnesses and not testimony just based on science.  See Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999). 
 205 See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 206 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 207 Id. at 191-93. 
 208 Id. at 195 (excluding part of the evidence submitted by Dr. Richard Drogin 
because he made an error in his mathematical computations). 
 209 Id. at 191 (quoting Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc., v. Newport 
Adhesives & Composites, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). 
 210 See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 153-56.  More specifically, the court used the 
expert witness’s testimony to conclude that the plaintiffs met the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).  Id. at 166. 
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Bielby assessed various Wal-Mart policies based on “subjective 
belief[s],”211 rather than “the methods and procedures of 
science.”212  In looking at various Wal-Mart policies, Dr. Bielby 
concluded that “managers make decisions with considerable 
discretion and little oversight”213 and “that subjective decisions 
such as these, as well as discretionary wage decisions are likely 
to be biased ‘unless they are assessed . . . with clear criteria 
and careful attention to the integrity of the decision-making 
process.’”214  Dr. Bielby based his opinion on what the court 
termed “social science research.”215 
In turning to the issue of social science research, other 
social scientists have reached the exact opposite conclusion 
than that of Dr. Bielby, though Wal-Mart surprisingly did not 
use this evidence in its case.216  One group of researchers found 
that the “distinction between [an] ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
[evaluative] measurement is neither meaningful nor useful in 
human performance.”217  Another group of researchers found 
that “the distinction between subjective and objective is 
problematic and somewhat arbitrary.”218  The most persuasive 
statement against Dr. Bielby, though, is that of the Dukes court 
itself.  In addressing the defendant’s objections to Dr. Bielby’s 
testimony, the court stated: 
Defendant also challenges Dr. Bielby’s opinions as unfounded and 
imprecise.  It is true that Dr. Bielby’s opinions have a built-in degree 
of conjecture.  He does not present a quantifiable analysis; rather, he 
combines the understanding of the scientific community with 
evidence of Defendant’s policies and practices, and concludes that 
Wal-Mart is “vulnerable” to gender bias.  Defendant rightly points 
out that Dr. Bielby cannot definitively state how regularly 
stereotypes play a meaningful role in employment decisions at Wal-
Mart.219 
  
 211 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 153 (citing Bielby Decl. ¶¶ 37-41). 
 214 Id. (quoting Bielby Decl. at ¶ 39). 
 215 Id. 
 216 See David Copus, Beware the Power of Junk Science, 177 N.J.L.J. 764 
(2004). 
 217 Fredrick Muckler & Sally A. Seven, Selecting Performance Measures: 
‘Objective’ versus ‘Subjective’ Measurement, 34 HUMAN FACTORS 441 (1992). 
 218 J. Kevin Ford et al., Study of Race Effects in Objective Indices and 
Subjective Evaluations of Performance: A Meta-Analysis of Performance Criteria, 99 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 331 (1986). 
 219 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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This statement indicates that Dr. Bielby’s testimony 
should fail under the Daubert analysis because it was based on 
“subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”220  Amazingly, 
however, at the special hearing, the Dukes court decided that 
Dr. Bielby’s testimony “[was] sufficiently probative to assist the 
Court in evaluating the class certification requirements at 
issue in this case.”221 
In reaching its conclusion, the court cited previous cases 
where the court admitted expert witness testimony, even 
though the testimony could not definitively state a 
conclusion.222  A majority of the cases relied on by the court 
dealt with a single employee or a group of employees suing an 
employer and not a class action lawsuit.223  Taking into account 
the fact that class action lawsuits are the exception to the 
rule,224 the court should have rejected Dr. Bielby’s testimony on 
account of its “built-in degree of conjecture,”225 and the fact that 
it resembles “junk science”226 and not “scientifically valid 
principles.”227 
V. THE COURT’S DECISION REGARDING TITLE VII ISSUES 
Congress amended Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.228  As part of the amendment, Congress granted victims 
of alleged intentional discrimination the right to seek 
compensatory and punitive damages.229  Whatever the 
intentions of Congress, the 1991 Amendment created 
  
 220 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (1993).  
 221 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 192. 
 222 Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989); Costa 
v. Desert Palace Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 861 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 223 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 192. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Butler 
v. Home Depot, Inc. to show that courts have admitted expert witness testimony based 
on social science) (citations omitted). 
 224 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (quoting Califano 
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). 
 225 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154 (citing Bielby Decl. ¶63).  “Conjecture” is defined 
by Merriam-Webster’s On-Line dictionary as an “inference from defective or 
presumptive evidence” or “a conclusion deduced by surmise or guesswork.”  Merriam-
Webster’s On-Line, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book= 
Dictionary&va=conjecture (last visited Oct. 15, 2005). 
 226 Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 227 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).  
[hereinafter Daubert II].  See also Chamblee, supra note 198, at 1048 (stating that 
courts normally use a low threshold when deciding on class certification, but that “they 
should use a higher standard to filter unreliable evidence.”). 
 228 See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1991). 
 229 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1991). 
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significant difficulties for plaintiffs involved in a class action 
employment discrimination lawsuit seeking compensatory 
and/or punitive damages.230  As stated in Rule 23(b)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs who seek class 
certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), can do so only if they 
are seeking “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief with respect to the class as a whole.”231   
These competing provisions result in a difficult situation 
for classes seeking to be certified while also requesting 
monetary damages.  As a result, the Advisory Committee for 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in looking at the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 in conjunction with Rule 23(b)(2), stated 
that class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) “does not 
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates 
exclusively or predominantly to monetary damages.”232  Despite 
this explicit warning, the Dukes court overlooked possible Title 
VII issues and permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their 
claims.233  In fact, the court concluded that it had “little 
difficulty”234 holding that the equitable relief predominated over 
the monetary relief sought.235   
This result is surprising given the outcome in Allison v. 
Citgo Petroleum Corp. which some have described as “[t]he 
best-known articulation”236 regarding employment class actions 
following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  In 
Allison, plaintiffs sued Citgo Petroleum Corporation, claiming 
that the supervisors at one plant engaged in racial 
discrimination in their employment decisions.237  The Fifth 
  
 230 See Hart, supra note 52, at 813. 
 231 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 232 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (emphasis added). 
 233 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 170-71 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 234 Id. at 171. 
 235 Id.  The court’s conclusion is even more surprising, because the court relied 
on Young v. Pierce, 544 F. Supp. 1010, 1028 (E.D. Tex. 1982).  It would appear that the 
court incorrectly relied on this decision given that there is a more recent case which 
dealt with the Civil Rights Amendment of 1991.  Young was decided before Congress 
passed The Civil Rights Act of 1991.  Although the Dukes plaintiffs seek injunctive and 
declaratory relief, they also seek monetary damages, a remedy unavailable in Young.  
The Dukes court, therefore, should have relied on cases after 1991 in order to 
determine if the injunctive and declaratory relief outweighed the monetary relief 
sought by the plaintiffs.  See infra note 141 for post-1991 cases involving the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.  Once again, it would appear that the Dukes court went to great 
lengths to certify this class, despite clear case precedent that would appear to point to 
the opposite result.   
 236 Hart, supra note 52, at 821-22. 
 237 See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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Circuit denied class certification because the monetary 
damages sought by the plaintiffs “[were] not incidental”238 to 
the injunctive or declaratory relief being sought.239 As a basis 
for its holding, the court wrote that 
The underlying premise of the [23](b)(2) class – that its members 
suffer from a common injury properly addressed by class-wide relief 
– “begins to break down when the class seeks to recover back pay or 
other forms of monetary relief to be allocated based on individual 
injuries.”  Thus, as claims for individually based money damages 
begin to predominate, the presumption of cohesiveness decreases 
while the need for enhanced procedural safeguards to protect 
individual rights of class members increases . . . .240 
Therefore, it is difficult to understand the court’s 
findings on this issue in Dukes.  Even though the plaintiffs 
were seeking punitive damages in the form of lost pay,241 the 
court had “little difficulty”242 in determining that the claim for 
punitive damages was incidental to the injunctive or 
declaratory relief sought.  This was so, despite the fact that 
based on prior cases, a jury award has the potential to 
bankrupt Wal-Mart.243 
The Dukes court’s stated rational for dismissing any 
Title VII damages problem is a further demonstration of its 
disregard for precedent and its intense desire to certify the 
Dukes class.244  In making its decision, the court in Dukes relied 
  
 238 Id. at 425.  In laying the foundation for denying class certification, the 
court stated:  
[T]he recovery of incidental damages should typically be concomitant with, 
not merely consequential to, class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief.  
Moreover, such damages should at least be capable of computation by means 
of objective standards and not dependent in any significant way on the 
intangible, subjective differences of each class member’s circumstances.   
Id. at 415.  
 239 Id.  The factual situation in Allison is quite similar to the one in Dukes.  
The Allison court described the situation as follows:  
[P]laintiffs seek to certify a class of a thousand potential plaintiffs spread 
across two separate facilities . . . working in seven different departments, 
challenging various policies and practices . . . .  Some plaintiffs may have 
been subjected to more virile discrimination than others:  with greater public 
humiliation, for longer periods of time, or based on more unjustifiable 
practices, for example.   
Id. at 417. 
 240 Id. at 413 (citations omitted). 
 241 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 242 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 243 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 244 The Dukes court stated that it based its findings on “ample legal 
precedent.”  Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  The contention of this Note is 
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solely on the depositions of the class representatives in 
determining that the punitive damages being sought were 
secondary to the equitable or injunctive relief being sought.245  
It would seem almost inconceivable that a court would rely so 
heavily on the affidavits of the very people seeking class 
certification in deciding whether or not to certify what would be 
largest private civil rights lawsuit in United States legal 
history.246  The court in Allison spent almost ten pages247 
discussing various Title VII issues when deciding whether or 
not to certify a class of “more than 1,000 potential members,”248 
a class that the court described as a “potentially huge and 
wide-ranging class.”249  The court in Dukes devoted only three 
pages250 to its discussion of any potential Title VII issues, 
despite the fact that Dukes involved a “proposed class [that] 
covers at least 1.5 million women”251 which the court called 
“historic in nature.”252  The court did not discuss whether 
damages would have to be determined on an individual basis or 
could be calculated based on “objective standards.”253  This 
disparity is only a further indication that the Dukes court 
casually dismissed significant legal issues in favor of certifying 
the class. 
VI. BLACKMAIL SETTLEMENTS 
The concern over blackmail settlements is an additional 
policy reason for supporting the denial of class certification in a 
case involving such a large number of plaintiffs and a possibly 
enormous award.  The idea behind a blackmail settlement is 
that a class will seek to be certified in order to “coerc[e] the 
  
that the court either misapplied legal precedent or construed it in such a way, so as to 
guarantee that the class would be certified. 
 245 See id. at 171.  
 246 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 247 See Allison, 151 F.3d at 409-18. 
 248 Id. at 407. 
 249 Id.  
 250 See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 170-72. 
 251 Id. at 142. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See Allison, 151 F.3d at 425.  Even when other courts have certified class 
actions  in Title VII cases, the courts considered the approach taken in Allison.  See, 
e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 163-67 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 388-89 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Faulk v. Home Oil 
Co., 186 F.R.D. 660, 662-65 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
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defendant into settlement.”254  In a speech in 1972, Judge 
Henry Friendly coined the term “blackmail settlement.”255  The 
concern regarding blackmail settlements is one that many 
courts and authors have recognized256 and courts began raising 
concerns surrounding blackmail settlements shortly after 
Judge Friendly coined the phrase.257  In 1998, Congress passed 
Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows 
defendants to seek an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s 
class certification.258  The Advisory Committee Notes state that 
one reason for allowing an interlocutory appeal is that “[a]n 
order granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle 
rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run 
the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”259  Courts have used 
Rule 23(f) and the guidance provided by the Advisory 
Committee notes to decertify classes when it appeared that 
class certification would pressure a defendant into settling.260 
As this Note mentioned earlier,261 the potential award in 
this case could be in the billions of dollars given the fact that in 
  
 254 Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1241 n.21 (11th Cir. 
2000).  
 255 Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A 
GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)). 
 256 See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978); Newton 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167-69 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).  See also THOMAS E. 
WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURTS:  FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 60 (Federal 
Judicial Center 1996) (in looking at class actions across four federal district courts, the 
authors found that “a substantial majority of certified class actions were terminated by 
class-wide settlements.”). 
 257 One of the earliest examples of a court discussing pressure to settle was in 
Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., where the court stated:  “I doubt that plaintiffs’ 
counsel expect the immense and unmanageable case that they seek to create to be 
tried.  What they seek to create will become (whether they intend this result or not) an 
overwhelmingly costly and potent engine for the compulsion of settlements, whether 
just or unjust.”  Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974).  
The Seventh Circuit has notably been at the forefront of not certifying or decertifying 
class action lawsuits because of the issue of blackmail settlements.  See generally In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2002); West v. Prudential 
Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 
1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 258 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 259 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 260 “The raison d’être for Rule 23(f) . . . provides a mechanism through which 
appellate courts, in the interests of fairness, can restore equilibrium when a doubtful 
class certification ruling would virtually compel a party to abandon a potentially 
meritorious claim or defense before trial.” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., v. Mowbray, 
208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000).  
 261 See supra note 24. 
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1999 a sexual discrimination lawsuit brought by 10,000 
employees settled for $25 million, which means that if divided 
equally, each claimant received $2,500.262  Assuming a jury 
awarded each claimant in Dukes $2,500, the total award in this 
case would be $3.75 billion.  Therefore, although neither the 
defense nor the court in Dukes raised the issue of blackmail 
settlements, it is an important issue, which should be discussed 
given the magnitude of the case and possible size of the 
settlement. 
Although Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class [be] so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,”263 an 
excessively large class can prove to be a double-edged sword 
when it comes to blackmail settlements.  In Coopers & Lybrand 
v. Livesay, plaintiffs sued an accounting firm, because they 
purchased securities based on a faulty prospectus certified by 
the firm.264  In denying class certification, the Supreme Court 
said that “certification of a large class may so increase the 
defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation costs that 
he may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a 
meritorious defense.”265  Picking up on the Court’s ruling in 
Livesay, the Third Circuit, in Newton v. Merrill Lynch,266 held 
that where “there are hundreds of thousands of class 
members,”267 “the size of the class and number of claims may 
place acute and unwarranted pressure on defendants to 
settle.”268  A number of other courts have also discussed the 
problems of an excessively large class and blackmail 
settlements.269  In recognizing that the pressure to settle is 
  
 262 See id.  Also see supra note 24 for an extreme example of a possible 
settlement amount ($289,312,039,312); however, a settlement for such an extreme 
amount would be unlikely as it would easily bankrupt Wal-Mart.  A recent article 
reported that Wal-Mart is seeking to settle this case, but no settlement amounts have 
been made public.  See Justin Scheck, Wal-Mart Said to Be in Talks to Settle Huge 
Class Action, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1110202461600 (last visited 
Oct.15, 2005). 
 263 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 264 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 465 (1978). 
 265 Id. at 476. 
 266 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
 267 Id. at 182. 
 268 Id. at 168 n.8. 
 269 See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t. Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“It may be that the aggregation in a class action of large numbers of statutory 
damages claims . . . could create a potentially enormous aggregate recovery for 
plaintiffs, and thus an in terrorem effect on defendants, which may induce unfair 
settlements.”) (emphasis in original); In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 288 F.3d at 
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problematic in class action lawsuits, it is surprising, to say the 
least, that neither the defense nor the court in Dukes addressed 
the issue in motions filed or the opinion rendered.  However, in 
June 2004, the Ninth Circuit, agreed to hear an interlocutory 
appeal of this case270 pursuant to Rule 23(f), so it is possible, if 
not quite likely, that the Ninth Circuit will address this issue 
given the purpose of Rule 23(f) as described in the Advisory 
Committee Notes.271 
VII. A PROPOSED GUIDE FOR CERTIFYING EMPLOYMENT 
CLASS ACTIONS 
The guide which I propose for class certifications is 
based on the holdings of other circuits.  By way of a brief 
outline, I propose five issues that courts should address when 
deciding whether or not to certify a class.  The first issue deals 
with why courts should utilize a standard closer to “rigorous 
analysis”272 than to “broad discretion”273 when deciding whether 
or not to certify a class.  The second issue involves whether or 
not a court should hold a parent company liable for the actions 
of individual managers if the individual manager is responsible 
for decision-making.  I identify examples of cases where 
individuals brought successful and unsuccessful lawsuits 
against Wal-Mart for sexual discrimination and explain why 
such an avenue is more appropriate than a class action lawsuit.  
Next, I recommend that courts consider the realities of 
certifying a huge class in relation to the commonality 
requirement.  I then propose that courts carefully consider the 
requirements for typicality in the context of large class action 
lawsuits so as to ensure that the requirements are truly met.  
Finally, I discuss the importance of considering the possible 
impact that class certification can have on settlement 
negotiations and the issue of blackmail settlements. 
  
1012, 1015-16 (“Aggregating millions of claims . . . makes the case so unwieldy, and the 
stakes so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable.”).  
 270 Bob Egelko, Review OKd in Wal-Mart Case: Court to Rule on Class-Action 
Status of Sex-Bias Lawsuit, S. F. CHRON., Aug. 14, 2004, at A-14.  
 271 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note. 
 272 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 162 (1982); Zinser 
v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 275 F.3d 
1266 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 273 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 143 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 n.28 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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A number of courts have proposed various levels of 
scrutiny when making a decision regarding class certification.  
The levels range from “broad discretion,”274 which the Dukes 
court used, to “rigorous analysis,”275 as the Supreme Court 
prescribed.  When deciding between these two extremes, the 
Court gave lower courts guidance by stating that class action 
lawsuits are “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 
only.”276  This note proposes that, because class action lawsuits 
are the exception to the rule, courts should utilize a higher 
degree of scrutiny than “broad discretion.”277  The Dukes court 
tries to leave itself some breathing room by stating that it could 
reconsider “certification throughout the legal proceedings 
before the court.”278  In a study sponsored by the Federal 
Judicial Center, though, the Center strongly suggested that 
once a court certifies a class, it is unlikely that a court will go 
back and decertify it based on “traditional rulings on motions 
or trials.”279  Therefore, rather than relying on an escape hatch, 
courts should acknowledge the purpose of a class action lawsuit 
and rigorously analyze a motion for class certification. 
In numerous cases, courts have declined to certify the 
class either when a class attempted to hold a corporate parent 
liable for the actions of an individual store, or when the 
corporate parent had little or no control over the individual 
store or unit.280  In each of these cases, the corporation had a 
policy of decentralized decision-making and the courts found 
that as a result of this policy, it was inappropriate to hold the 
corporate parent liable for decisions made in an individual 
store.  A more appropriate method of adjudication in these 
types of cases is for individual plaintiffs to bring individual 
lawsuits against a particular store.   
Several cases exist where Wal-Mart employees 
successfully sued individual stores for sexual harassment.  In 
  
 274 Id. 
 275 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 162; Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. 
 276 Id. at 155 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). 
 277 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143 (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 872 
n.28 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 278 Id. 
 279 See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 256, at 80. 
 280 See Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619 (N.D. 
Ga. 2003); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ga. 2001); 
Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., 205 F.R.D. 558 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Zachery v. Texaco 
Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999).  
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Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court consolidated thirteen 
plaintiffs’ cases, all of whom alleged racial discrimination 
against a single Wal-Mart store.281  At trial, a jury found in 
favor of two of the eleven plaintiffs, awarding them a total of 
$375,000.282  Of course, a number of employees’ claims failed, 
but that is to be expected, just as in any other lawsuit.  In 
Moulds v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., plaintiffs alleged racial and 
sexual discrimination against a Wal-Mart store.283  The 
Eleventh Circuit found for Wal-Mart on the grounds that it had 
a legitimate reason for choosing another employee for 
promotion over plaintiff.284  It is apparent, therefore, that 
plaintiffs do have the ability to challenge Wal-Mart’s practices 
and win, but on a scale that is far more manageable than 1.5 
million women.  
The numerosity requirement appears to act as a double-
edged sword.  A class wants to be sufficiently large so as to 
satisfy the numerosity requirement; however, if a class is too 
large, there are potential issues of manageability and 
commonality which could preclude certification.  Many other 
courts have identified class diversity as, at least, a partial 
reason for denying certification.285  As the class size gets larger, 
there is less of a chance that every class member suffered from 
the same discrimination.  The court in Donaldson stated that 
“where a putative class involves extensive diversity in terms of 
geography, job requirements, and/or managerial 
responsibilities”286 commonality does not exist.287  By tying the 
issue of commonality to numerosity, the Donaldson court 
demonstrated that, while a large class fulfilled the numerosity 
requirement of Rule 23,288 it was ultimately class diversity that 
caused the court to find that the class lacked commonality. 
In the employment context, it is very difficult to fulfill 
the typicality requirement, as it is nearly impossible to prove 
that a large class of plaintiffs all suffered from a common policy 
of discrimination.  This is especially true when a corporation 
uses a decentralized subjective decision-making process.  If a 
  
 281 Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999).  
 282 Id.  
 283 Moulds v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 284 Id. at 256-67. 
 285 See Reid, 205 F.R.D. at 666; Donaldson, 205 F.R.D. at 567; Zachery, 185 
F.R.D. at 239-40. 
 286 Donaldson, 205 F.R.D. at 567.   
 287 Id.  
 288 Id. at 565. 
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plaintiff claims that he was subjected to discrimination on a 
local level, due to subjective decision-making procedures, then 
that is evidence of an “individual disparate treatment claim,”289 
but insufficient for class action status.290  The Supreme Court 
raised the legal standard by requiring “significant proof”291 if 
the subjective decision-making process is used as a basis for 
class certification.292  If courts are to certify a class based on a 
claim that a corporation used subjective decision-making 
procedures, then plaintiffs should either have to offer evidence 
revealed during discovery or present expert witness testimony 
that is scrutinized using a Daubert analysis.  In this way, a 
court would fulfill the directive of the Supreme Court to obtain 
“significant proof”293 of the plaintiffs’ claims. 
Courts finally must acknowledge that if they certify a 
large class, most plaintiffs will settle the case, rather than 
leave their fate to the flip of a coin.  A number of courts have 
refused to certify or have even decertified a class when they 
believed that certification would force the defendant to settle.294  
Courts, therefore, must ensure that the plaintiffs have viable 
claims, and if they do, that the parties have exhausted all 
settlement possibilities before deciding on class certification.295 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dukes is an excellent 
example of a class action certification gone wrong.  In certifying 
the class, the court ignored the Supreme Court’s decree that 
class action lawsuits are the exception to the rule.296  The court 
mischaracterizes Wal-Mart’s intentions as trying to 
“insulate”297 itself merely because of the lawsuit’s size, when, in 
  
 289 Zachery, 185 F.R.D. at 238. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15 (1982). 
 292 Id.  See also Chamblee, supra note 198. 
 293 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15. 
 294 “‘Hydraulic pressure . . . to settle’ is now a recognized objection to class 
certification.”  Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2003) (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 295 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (The purpose of the Rules is “to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”)  Encouraging parties to settle 
avoids a long, drawn-out litigation process. 
 296 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 
(1979)). 
 297 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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reality, Wal-Mart’s main concern is the manageability of the 
case.298  Protecting and ensuring women’s rights is a noble and 
worthy cause, but it does not outweigh legal precedent.  Rather 
than certifying the class, which will most likely force Wal-Mart 
to settle, unless the class is decertified on appeal, the court 
would have better served these women by denying class 
certification and suggesting that they pursue their cases on a 
smaller, more manageable scale.  By bringing their actions 
individually, these plaintiffs would have their claims heard and 
the litigation would be conducted in its normal fashion, namely 
“by and behalf of the individual named parties only.”299 
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